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FOR THE SECRETARY FROM THE AMBASSADOR

E.O. 11652: XGDS-2

TAGS: PFOR AO OAU

SUBJECT: ANGOLA AND THE OAU SUMMIT

REF STATE 10166

1. SUMMARY: AFTER REVIEWING OAU MEETING WITH FONMIN WAIYAKI, HE INDICATED HE HAS CHANGED HIS VIEWS ON U.S. INVOLVEMENT AND NOW FEELS IT IMPERATIVE U.S. TAKE ACTION (SHORT OF U.S. TROOPS) TO MAKE MPLA REALIZE IT CANNOT WIN. FIRST ACTION MUST BE FOR SOUTH AFRICA TO WITHDRAW TROOPS (WAIYAKI PLEASSED WITH SECRETARY KISSINGER'S JANUARY 14 STATEMENT. END SUMMARY.

2. ON JANUARY 16 I MET ALONE WITH FONMIN WAIYAKI TO REVIEW ANGOLA AND THE OAU SUMMIT. AS INSTRUCTED, I EXPRESSED U.S. GRATIFICATION REGARDING MODERATES' POSITION IN ADDIS AND OBSERVED BATTLE ONLY STARTED. WAIYAKI'S RESPONSE WAS THAT OFFENSIVE MILITARY ACTION NOW NEEDED TO COUNTER MPLA POLITICAL AND TERRITORIAL POSITION.

3. IN REPLY TO MY QUERY, WAIYAKI STATED THAT ACCORDING TO HIM THE FOLLOWING PRO-MPLA COUNTRIES WERE DRIVING FORCE (IN ORDER OF AGGRESSIVENESS): NIGERIA, MOZAMBIQUE, TANZANIA, GUINEA, GUINEA BISSAU, SAN TOME AND PRINCIPE,

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CAPE VERDE, ALGERIA, BENIN, LIBERIA AND MADAGASCAR.

THOSE LOOKING FOR A COMPROMISE POSITION: GHANA AND MAURITIUS, PARTICULARLY LATTER. WAIYAKI BELIEVES, AS WE DO, THAT PRO-MPLA COUNTRIES AND SOVIETS WILL DO EVERYTHING THEY CAN TO PERSUADE ANTI-MPLA SUPPORTERS INTO THEIR CAMP; SIERRA LEONE AND GAMBIA MAY WELL BE NEXT, THE LATTER PARTICULARLY DUE TO SOVIET INFLUENCE. AT ADDIS WAIYAKI OBSERVED CONSIDERABLE BUT NOT SPECIFIC CUBAN AND SOVIET PRESENCE AND DISCUSSION WITH PRO-MPLA COUNTRY DELEGATES. WAIYAKI INFORMED ME THAT THE SOMALI FOREIGN MINISTER TOLD HIM DURING RECENT VISIT TO MOMBASA THAT "DEATHS DON'T MATTER IF THE OBJECTIVE IS ACHIEVED." THIS WAS CLEARLY THE POSITION THAT HE TOOK IN ADDIS AND ALSO WAS CLEARLY THE TOEING OF THE SOVIET LINE. EVEN YUGOSLAVS WERE "INTERESTED" BUT DID NOT "PUSH" ANTI-MPLA COUNTRIES. PRO-MPLA COUNTRIES WERE OBVIOUSLY SURPRISED BY MODERATES' FIRM STAND (WAIYAKI ESPECIALLY CITED GUINEA BISSAU).

4. WAIYAKI RAISED QUESTION OF SOUTH AFRICA'S PRESENCE IN ANGOLA AS GREATEST PROBLEM; I REFERRED HIM TO SECRETARY'S JANUARY 14 PRESS CONFERENCE AND GAVE HIM COPY OF EXTRACTED STATEMENTS INCLUDING THAT ON U.S. PREPAREDNESS TO ENCOURAGE SOUTH AFRICAN WITHDRAWAL. WAIYAKI APPEARED PLEASED WITH THIS STATEMENT BUT PURSUED SUBJECT NOTING THAT ARGUMENT IS THAT SOUTH AFRICA IS CONSIDERED BY MANY TO BE AN INVADING FORCE AS OPPOSED TO SOVIETS AND CUBANS WHO WERE "INVITED" INTO ANGOLA (BY MPLA). HE NOTED THIS IS NOT HIS ARGUMENT BUT THAT OF THOSE SPEAKING IN STRONGEST TERMS FOR SOUTH AFRICA TO WITHDRAW. CONTINUING, HE CAME TO MAIN THRUST OF HIS PRESENT THINKING: U.S. MUST "MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR FNLA/UNITA TO MAKE GAINS IN THE BATTLE. MPLA MUST BE MADE TO REALIZE THEY CAN'T WIN." THE CUBANS SAY THEY CAN'T GET OUT UNLESS REQUESTED TO DO SO BY THE MPLA. THE CUBANS AND SOVIETS, ACCORDING TO WAIYAKI, WILL TRY TO TAKE OVER ALL OF ANGOLA BEFORE THE OAU MEETS IN MAURITIUS IN JUNE. THE ALTERNATE TO FIGHTING IS TO CAPITULATE, WHICH ONLY ENCOURAGES THE SOVIETS TO PLAY THEIR OWN GAME FURTHER IN AFRICA AND INTO THE INDIAN OCEAN, DESTROYING ETHIOPIA AND KENYA. WAIYAKI REITERATED
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THAT MPLA MUST BE PLACED IN A DEFENSIVE POSITION. BY DOING SO AND BY LEAVING THE WAY OPEN FOR THEM TO TALK AT ANY TIME, THEY WILL BE FINALLY FORCED INTO A POSITION OF HAVING TO TALK. WAIYAKI AGREED HE HAD CHANGED HIS POSITION SINCE HE TALKED WITH SENATOR CLARK, AT WHICH TIME HE SAID THE AMERICANS SHOULD NOT RPT NOT BE INVOLVED IN ANGOLA. HOWEVER, THE SITUATION HAS NOW CHANGED AND THE AMERICANS MUST BE INVOLVED IN ANGOLA (ALTHOUGH

WAIYAKI DID NOT MEAN U.S. TROOPS ON ANGOLAN SOIL). I ASKED WAIYAKI WHETHER -- ALTHOUGH HE WAS TELLING ME PRIVATELY THAT THE U.S. SHOULD BE INVOLVED -- HE WOULD NOT IN FACT CRITICIZE THE U.S. PUBLICLY FOR ITS INVOLVEMENT, TO WHICH HE REPLIED THAT HE WOULD NOT. STRESSING THAT U.S. POLICY WAS TOWARD A CEASE-FIRE, WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN TROOPS, AND WORKING TOWARD A STATE OF NATIONAL UNITY I, NEVERTHELESS, PUT THE QUESTION TO WAIYAKI AS TO HOW HE WOULD FEEL ABOUT A DIVISION OF ANGOLA INTO TWO STATES. HE REPLIED THAT WHILE THIS MIGHT BE A SOLUTION, HE CERTAINLY WOULD NOT BE HAPPY TO SEE IT HAPPEN; ANGOLA SHOULD REMAIN UNITED. WAIYAKI THEN OBSERVED THAT JONAS SAVIMBI WILL STAND AND FIGHT. WAIYAKI FAVORS SAVIMBI OVER HOLDEN ROBERTO WHO, HE FEELS, HAS LOST ALL HIS STEAM.

5. I RAISED WITH WAIYAKI STATEMENT FOREIGN MINISTRY PERMSEC LEONARD KIBINGE MADE TO ME (NAIROBI 0067) REGARDING HOPE THAT SOVIETS WOULD GET OUT OF ANGOLA AND GO TO FREE NAMIBIA. I ASKED WAIYAKI WHETHER THIS, INDEED, WAS HIS VIEW TO WHICH HE REPLIED THAT IT WAS, BUT MORE AS A COUNTER ARGUMENT THAN A REALITY, WHEN HE INDEED HAD SAID PRIVATELY TO SOVIET AMBASSADOR TO KENYA MIROSHNICHENKO THAT THE SOVIETS BEING IN ANGOLA ARE FIGHTING THE WRONG BATTLE, THAT INSTEAD THEY SHOULD GO BEHIND SOUTH AFRICA AND CUT THEM OFF FROM THE BACK, THUS HELPING NAMIBIA. WAIYAKI SAID THAT AMBASSADOR MIROSHNICHENKO REPLIED THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE TO "FREE ANGOLA FIRST."

6. THE GOK FEELS CHEATED IN ITS EFFORTS TO BRING ABOUT A SOLUTION AMONG THE THREE LIBERATION GROUPS IN ANGOLA. PRESIDENT KENYATTA ASSISTED IN PROVIDING MOMBASA AS A MEETING PLACE FOR THE THREE GROUPS WHO THEN WENT AWAY
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AND RETURNED IN 48 HOURS FOR A MEETING IN NAKURU. WAIYAKI SAID HE HAD ADVISED THE PRESIDENT NOT TO ALLOW THEM TO RETURN, THAT THEY WERE ACTING LIKE CHILDREN, BUT THAT KENYATTA WANTED TO DO WHAT HE COULD TO ASSIST DIALOGUE AND A SOLUTION BETWEEN THE THREE FACTIONS. THEY ARRIVED IN NAKURU NOT TALKING TO ONE ANOTHER AND EACH PERSONALLY CARRYING A GUN. HOWEVER THEY SIGNED A DOCUMENT OF AGREEMENT BUT THEN TWO WEEKS AFTERWARDS STARTED THEIR FIGHTING IN ANGOLA.

7. LOOKING AT THE BROADER VIEW OF AFRICAN "ACCEPTANCE" OF THE SOVIETS IN AFRICA, WAIYAKI OBSERVED THAT THE AFRICAN COUNTRIES DON'T FACE UP TO THE REALITY OF COMMUNISM. THEY FEEL (WAIYAKI BELIEVES WRONGLY) THAT NOTHING CAN BE LOST BY ALLOWING THE SOVIETS AND

COMMUNISM TO PLAY A ROLE IN THE LIBERATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THEIR COUNTRIES. THEY BELIEVE, FOR ONE THING, THE COMMUNIST PARTY SYSTEM IS SO DEGRADING THAT NO AFRICAN WOULD EVER JOIN IT. HOWEVER, THE STRONGEST REASON FOR AFRICAN ACCEPTANCE OF THE SOVIETS IS THAT THEY ALLEGEDLY SHOW NO RACIAL DISCRIMINATION WHILE AMERICANS DO. WAIYAKI CONTINUED BY POINTING OUT THAT THE ARGUMENT AGAINST THE U.S. BY ITS OPPONENTS IN AFRICA IS THAT AMERICANS SHOULD UNDERSTAND AFRICA (PARTICULARLY AS SO MANY AMERICANS CAME FROM AFRICA) BUT THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT AND DID NOT COME TO THE ASSISTANCE OF THE LIBERATION OF MOZAMBIQUE. IT IS ONLY COMING NOW TO ANGOLA'S ASSISTANCE IN ORDER TO KEEP THE SOVIETS OUT AND TO PROTECT THE WEALTH OF SOUTH AFRICA. THE ARGUMENT OF THE PRO-SOVIET AFRICANS, ACCORDING TO WAIYAKI, IS THAT AFRICA WOULD NOT BE FREE IF IT WEREN'T FOR COMMUNIST AID.

8. WAIYAKI WAS CLEARLY APPRECIATIVE OF U.S. APPROACH AND INTEREST IN WORKING TOWARD A SOLUTION IN ANGOLA. WAIYAKI'S BOTTOM LINE CONCLUSION IS THAT IF THE THREE FACTIONS IN ANGOLA DO NOT UNITE, THEY "HAVE HAD THEIR CHIPS": THEY'VE HAD IT; THEREFORE A SOLUTION TOWARD ANGOLAN UNITY NEEDS U.S. ASSISTANCE.
MARSHALL

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